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Abstract 
Managing accident risk at Railway Level Crossings (RLCs) has been an important issue for both railway and highway 
infrastructure managers and operators. The term risk management of RLCs includes the process which is followed, the means 
used and measures taken in order to achieve a specific goal related to the aspect of safety of RLCs. Improvement of the safety 
level can be reached either by reducing the probability of having an accident or by reducing the consequences of the accidents or 
by their combination. Safety improvement is costly, however what is not often known is its correlation with the required cost. 
This paper presents a scientific “tool” for managing the safety of RLCs. A methodology is developed in order to assist the 
railway infrastructure managers to decide on the type and size of the interventions to be made at a level crossing of the railway 
network in order to improve its safety. The methodology uses the conventional evaluation indicators of the economic efficiency 
of an investment/project (NPV; IRR; cost/benefit ratio) as a criterion for the decision making; at the same time it enables the 
correlation of these indicators to the improvement of the safety level. The methodology is then applied to RLCs with specific 
constructional and operational characteristics. The proposed methodology may be applied in all incident categories and for 
various causes subject to appropriate modifications. 
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1. Objective of the paper & field of application 
This paper presents a scientific “tool” for managing the safety of Railway Level Crossings (RLCs). 
A methodology is developed in order to assist the railway infrastructure managers to decide on the type and size of 
the interventions to be made at a level crossing of the railway network in order to improve its safety. The 
methodology uses the conventional evaluation indicators of the economic efficiency of an investment/project (NPV; 
IRR; cost/benefit ratio) as a criterion for the decision making; at the same time it enables the correlation of these 
indicators to the improvement of the safety level. The methodology is then applied to RLCs with specific 
constructional and operational characteristics. The proposed methodology may be applied in all incident categories 
and for various causes subject to appropriate modifications. 
2. The concept of safety management at railway level crossings 
The term safety management of RLCs includes the process which is followed, the means used and measures 
taken in order to achieve a specific goal related to the aspect of safety of RLC.  
Regarding the procedure followed: 
It includes the identification, assessment and hierarchization of risks identified in the RLC. 
Regarding the means used: 
Includes all scientific “tools”, relevant legislation and regulations, manpower, financial resources, equipment. 
Economic resources include money allocated by the infrastructure manager for the implementation of 
means/measures to improve safety, but also for equipment operation and maintenance. 
Regarding the measures taken: 
These relate to the constructional and operational characteristics of the RLC. The interventions which may 
alternatively occur in a RLC are essentially three (Mallet, 1987; George, 1999): 
x Elimination of railway level crossings  
x Grade separation of the level crossing  
x Improvement of railway level crossing’s constructional and operational characteristics. 
The removal of a RLC and the shifting of road traffic flow to the next – possibly level- crossing through the 
adjacent road, means essentially shifting the risk to the next crossing, and results to increased travel time for the 
road users. 
Τhe conversion of an RLC to a non-level crossing is performed by constructing underpasses or flyovers 
(overpasses). 
Finally improving the railway level crossing’s characteristics of a RLC includes:  
x conversion of the RLC from passive to active1. 
x systematic maintenance of the equipment of the RLC 
x upgrading of the existing equipment of an active RLC 
x removal of the elements (e.g. advertising boards) that constitute potential distraction for the road vehicles’ drivers 
and trains’ drivers. 
x installation of Closed-Circuit TeleVision (CCTV) 
x installation of automatic obstacle detection system 
 
 
1 “Passive level crossing”: level crossing without any form of warning system or protection activated when it is unsafe for the user to traverse 
the crossing”. “Active level crossing”: level crossing where the crossing users are protected from or warned of the approaching train by devices 
activated when it is unsafe for the user to traverse the crossing.” 
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x improvement of the visibility conditions 
x improvement of the lighting 
x improvement of the pavement 
A parameter that significantly influences the risk level of RLCs is the daily traffic moment2. It is included among 
the operational characteristics of a RLC and is the main (if not the only) criterion in many railway networks for the 
conversion of a passive crossing to an active one. 
 
In figure 1, the number of rail accidents depending on the traffic moment (M) of RLCs is given: 
x for the railway network of North Greece 
x for the time period 2004-2013 
x for a sample of 69 accidents on RLCs of which data were available 
x and for various categories of protection 
 
 
Fig. 1. Railway network of N. Greece. Period 2004–2013 – number of rail accidents depending on the traffic moment and for various categories 
of protection of RLCs. 
Figure 1 shows that the number of accidents increases in accordance to the increase of traffic moment. It is worth 
mentioning that in RLCs with a low traffic moment (M < 2,000), a higher number of accidents is observed than in 
crossings with 2,000 < M < 10,000, because there are many unguarded crossings in this category (M < 2,000). 
Figure 2 provides, for two active RLCs of the examined railway network with the same constructional features 
but different traffic moment: 
x the total number of accidents that occurred in the decade 2004-13, 
x the number of deaths and 
x the number of injuries 
Based on figure 2, it is concluded that the increase in traffic moment is accompanied by an increase in accidents, 
especially the fatal ones. 
 
 
2  “Daily traffic moment”: The number of trains moving on the track in both directions per 24 hours multiplied by the number of passing road 
vehicles of all types in both directions of the crossing during the same 24hour period. 
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Fig. 2. Railway network of North Greece. Time period 2004–2013 – RLC – KP: 8+ 324 and KP: 34 + 181 – accident data. 
Regarding the aspect of safety:  
The safety that a railway system provides to its users can be defined using two approaches:  
a. Definition according to the risk level  
This approach suggests a qualitative assessment of safety. In the case of a railway system the term “safety” 
describes the guarantee, through the constituents and the components of the railway system, that during operation 
the risk level is not described as “non permissible”. The classification of the risk is uniquely accrued by the 
combination of the frequency and the severity of an event. This correlation defines the following four risk levels 
(Table 1). 
In order to classify the various accidents according to the severity of their consequences, CENELEC European 
Standards adopt specific definitions (catastrophic, severe etc). However, as far as accident frequency is 
concerned, there are as yet no European standards clearly defining the borderlines between the various 
classifications (Possible, Occasional, etc), and this causes difficulties in applying table 1 (Ioannidou & Pyrgidis, 
2014). 
b. Definition according to incident “indicators”  
This approach suggests a quantitative assessment of safety. The safety which a railway system provides is 
evaluated by the incidents that occurred during a specific time period (e.g. one year) and had consequences on the 
track, the rolling stock, the passengers, the cargo and the environment.  
Worldwide various countries use specific indicators to assess the safety of their railway networks. These 
indicators differ very little among the various countries (Australian Government, 2012; Japan Transport Safety 
Board, 2013; U.S. FRA, 2003; Indian Government, 2013). 
Table 1. Risk levels based on the frequency and severity of accidents (European Standard EN50126, 2003; EC, 2009)  
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Risk Levels 
Accident severity 
Catastrophic Severe Minor importance Negligible 
Frequent Non permissible  Non permissible Non permissible Non desirable 
Possible Non permissible Non permissible Non desirable Permissible 
Occasional Non permissible Non desirable Non desirable Permissible 
Unusual Non desirable Non desirable Permissible Unimportant 
Rare Permissible Permissible Unimportant Unimportant 
Unlikely Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant 
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In order to apply the EU Directive 2004/49 for safety and its revision 2009/149/EC (EC, 2009) ERA (European 
Railway Agency) proposed a series of indicators (ERA, 2013) concerning railway incidents, their impact in relation 
to human life, economic impact, technical impact, etc. More emphasis is placed on human life, as any incident is 
directly related to its consequences upon it. Consequences may include fatality, serious injury and light injury.  
Indicatively such indicators are:  
x Total number of serious accidents (number) 
x Relative number of serious accidents (number/train – kilometers) 
x Distribution of accidents per accident category 
x Fatality risk indicator: death toll as a result of train accidents per million train – kilometers 
Regarding the objectives associated with the aspect of safety:  
Based on the first definition given concerning safety, its improvement lies essentially on the adoption of the 
appropriate measures which will enable, either by increasing the frequency only, or by increasing the severity only, 
or both simultaneously, to ensure a better than before risk level (e.g. from non permissible to permissible). 
Based on the second definition given concerning safety, its improvement lies essentially on the adoption of the 
appropriate measures which will permit the reduction of a specific indicator which will obtain a lower value than 
a value that has been set as a target. Indicatively, taking into consideration all fatalities from railway accidents 
(excluding suicides), the EU “fatality risk indicator” in 2009-2011 had a value of 0.31 fatalities per million train – 
kilometers (ERA, 2013). 
In any case, the safety management of RLCs requires the knowledge of correlation between the cost of 
interventions and the improvement of safety level. The quantification of this correlation is difficult because it is 
defined by a number of factors, whose characteristics have not been specified yet (Ioannidou & Pyrgidis, 2014). 
3. The concept of safety management at railway level crossings 
For the correlation between the interventions’ cost and the anticipated safety improvement two methods can be 
followed. These two methods are based on the two different definitions of railway safety which were given in 
paragraph 2.The chart of figure 3 illustrates the first six (6) steps of the proposed methodology which are common to 
both methods: 
As seen in the chart illustrated in figure 3, regardless of the methodology that will be followed, the correlation 
between interventions’ cost and anticipated safety improvement presupposes the following: 
x Definition of the study area and, particularly, the “level” of the railway system for which accidents are assessed 
(e.g. whole network, railway corridor, track section, railway system constituent, etc) 
x The approach per accident category and, for each accident category, per accident cause at first level at least 
(Pyrgidis & Sarafidou, 2007)  
x The costing of the accidents’ consequences 
x The definition of the type and extend of the measures to be taken. The combination of study area, accident 
category and accident cause will determine the relevant range of choices 
x The costing of the above measures 
Consequences of accidents include fatalities, injuries, materiel damage which covers both rolling stock and 
infrastructure damages, environmental damage and delays of service.  
This paper further develops the second method (method based on the change in the value of accident indicators). 
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Fig. 3. Proposed methodology for the correlation between interventions’ cost and anticipated safety improvement – first common steps for the 
two methods. 
The correlation between the cost of interventions and safety improvement lies with the calculation of the amount 
of money that should be invested in order to reduce the current value of the indicator by a specific percentage or to 
set a new target value (i.e. the average rate applicable for EU countries for this incident category). 
The first six (6) steps which are common to both approaches (see figure 3) are followed by the steps outlined here 
under:  
Step 7: Assessment of the impact that the intervention’s implementation has on the parameters that form the 
numerical expression and, as a result, the value of the indicator (number of accidents). 
Step 8: New situation – Calculation of new indicator’s value.  
Step 9: Correlation between the change in the indicator’s value and the cost of interventions. 
The assessment of the impact that the intervention’s implementation has on the number of accidents is the most 
difficult task. It can potentially be addressed by one of three ways, namely:  
x By appropriate prediction models (Coleman & Stewart,1976; Morfoulaki et al 1994;Papaioannou et al, 2015) 
x By recording the number of incidents that have taken place or will take place at a particular RLC for at least five 
years after the implementation of mitigation measures and comparing them with the previous situation 
x Based on statistics from other networks with similar functionality (Washington & Oh, 2006; Saccomanno et al, 
2006) 
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4. Case studies 
4.1. Individual passive RLC – conversion to active RLC 
Incident type: Accident  
Accident category: Accident at passive RLC  
Special accident category: Collision of a train with a road vehicle 
Cause of accident: First level: Railway infrastructure; Second level: Poor visibility 
Used indicator: Number of fatal accidents (each with at least one fatality) hence number of fatalities in the long 
term of 25 years = 10 fatalities = 0.40 fatalities per year 
Intervention: Improvement of RLC’ constructional characteristics  
Measure: Installation of automatic barriers 
Intervention cost: € 570,000 (Installation of automatic barriers) + € 5,000 (Annual maintenance cost) 
Impact of measure implementation: Reduction of fatal accidents and, therefore, of the number of fatalities by 
50% (Morfoulaki et al 1994) 
Indicator’s new value: 5 fatalities over 25 years – 0.20 fatalities per year 
Cost of fatalities: € 836,000 x number of fatalities + € 760,000 per year (fixed premiums) (ERA, 2009) 
Economic life period of barriers = 25 years 
Results of cost – benefit analysis: cost-benefit ratio = 4.761069 >> 1 (25 year assessment period, 5.5% discount 
rate)  
4.2. Individual passive RLC – conversion to overpass 
Incident type: Accident  
Accident category: Accident at passive RLC  
Special accident category: Collision of a train with a road vehicle 
Cause of accident: First level: Railway infrastructure; Second level: Poor visibility 
Used indicator: Number of fatal accidents (each with at least one fatality) hence number of fatalities in the long 
term of 25 years = 10 fatalities = 0.40 fatalities per year 
Intervention: Grade separation of the level crossing 
Measure: Construction of an overpass  
Intervention cost: € 3,200,000 + € 3,500 (Annual maintenance cost) 
Impact of measure implementation: Reduction of fatal accidents and, therefore, of the number of fatalities by 
100%  
Indicator’s new value: 0 fatalities over 25 years – 0.00 fatalities per year 
Cost of fatalities: € 836,000 x number of fatalities + € 760,000 per year (fixed premiums) (ERA, 2009) 
Economic life period of barriers = 25 years 
Results of cost – benefit analysis: cost-benefit ratio = 1.661069 > 1 (25 year assessment period, 5.5% discount 
rate)  
Internal Return Ratio (IRR) = 12% 
4.3. Passive level crossings at railway network level 
Incident type: Accident  
Accident category: Accident at passive RLC 
Special accident category: Collision of a train with a road vehicle 
Cause of accident: First level: Railway infrastructure; Second level: Poor visibility 
Total number of fatalities per year: 10 
Total length of track: 2,500 km 
Number of passive RLCs = 500 
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Used indicator: Number of fatalities as a result from accidents at passive RLCs per RLC/ track-km = 0.000008 
fatalities per year 
Assumption: The accidents occur in 50 RLCs only (out of 500). Half of these (25) present a total number of 
6 accidents during the 25-year period each and the rest (25) present a total number of 4 accidents each. 
Intervention: Improvement of RLCs’ constructional characteristics  
Measure: Installation of 50 automatic barriers 
Intervention cost: 570,000 € (Installation of automatic barriers) + 5,000 € (Annual maintenance cost) 
Impact of measure implementation: Reduction of fatal accidents by 50% (i.e. 5 per year)  
Indicator’s new value: 0.000004 
Cost of fatalities: 836,000 € x number of fatalities +760,000 € per year (fixed premiums)  
Economic Life period of barriers = 25 years 
Results of cost – benefit analysis: cost-benefit ratio = 2.81 > 1 (25 year assessment period, 5.5% discount rate) 
 
Figure 4 depicts the change of the total cost (implementation + maintenance of automatic barriers) and the benefit 
(reduction of deaths – Present Values in Euros) when we intervene in a growing number of RLCs.  
Figure 5 depicts the change of the indicator “fatalities at passive RLCs per RLC/track – km” respectively.  
 
Fig. 4. Change of the total cost and the benefit when we intervene in a growing number of RLCs. 
 
Fig. 5. Change of the indicator “fatalities at passive RLCs per RLC/track km” when we intervene in a growing number of RLCs. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a procedure is developed which allows the correlation between the cost which is required for the 
application of measures dealing with accidents which occur within a RLC and the improvement of the level of safety 
as a result from their implementation. The proposed scientific “tool” may assist the railway infrastructure managers 
to decide on the type and size of the interventions to be made at a level crossing of the railway network in order to 
improve its safety. 
Safety level improvement is expressed quantitatively, with the decrease of a selected safety indicator. 
 
The application of this procedure presupposes the following: 
x Definition of the study area and, particularly, the “level” of the railway system for which accidents are assessed 
(e.g. whole network, railway corridor, track section, railway system constituent, etc). 
x The approach per accident category and, for each accident category, per accident cause at first level at least.  
x The selection of the appropriate indicator and the fixing of its target value to obtain. 
x The definition of the type and extend of the measures to be taken and mainly.  
x The assessment of the impact that the intervention’s implementation has on the different terms of its 
mathematical expression (e.g. reduction of number of deaths).  
Further research shall include:  
x The creation of a database including all possible combinations: Incidents at RLCs – Incident categories at RLCs – 
First level cause – Second level cause – Safety improvement/consequences reduction measures – Effectiveness of 
the measures. 
x The selection of the appropriate indicator for each incident category. 
x A more accurate estimation of the measures’ effectiveness.  
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